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Economic Policy
Commentary

Here I shall comment infrequently (but often enough)  on matters of economic policy and the current state of the U.S. economy.  The focus will be on monetary policy (the Fed,) and fiscal policy (the  White House,  and the U.S. Congress.)

March 7, 2005


Today's page A2 Wall Street Journal article, based on the most-recently released transcripts of the FOMC's deliberations, provides a brief but good  description of a Central Bank operating under uncertainty.  This is a topic that some of you may want to explore after the final exam  It will be instructive to read at least one transcript of such deliberations, say, that of February 1999.  The URL is:

http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/transcripts/1999/1999020203meeting.pdf


Fed Officials Worried in 1999
About Managing Stock 'Bubble'

By JOSEPH REBELLO
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 7, 2005; Page A2

WASHINGTON -- Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and his colleagues continued to regard the soaring stock prices of the late 1990s as a "bubble" long after he publicly stated it was beyond his ken to make a prognosis of investor giddiness, according to new documents released by the central bank.

Amid an international fright in 1999 about the economic havoc that might be wreaked by the so-called Y2K computer bug, many Fed policy makers said they thought the likelihood of big disruptions was small, transcripts of their meetings that year show. But they worried regularly about how to manage the stock "bubble" and delayed interest-rate increases partly because they feared triggering a market crash.
Transcripts of the Fed's policy meetings, released with the customary five-year lag Friday, also show that even though the Fed's staff forecasters regarded U.S. stock prices as irrationally high, they underestimated the size of the bubble. They concluded that in the event of a stock-market crash, the unemployment rate wouldn't rise much higher than 5% and inflation would climb to about 2.5%. As it turned out, the jobless rate peaked at 6.3% after stock prices crashed and the economy sank into recession in 2001.

Mr. Greenspan, however, was skeptical about that assessment. "If someone were to say that a bust in stock-market prices would leave us with a 5% unemployment rate and an inflation rate of 2.5%, some might say 'Bring it on!' " he said at a February 1999 meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee. Even so, he said, "were these types of shocks to occur, I suspect the end results would be quite different."

The Fed waited until June 1999 to start raising its key federal-funds rate even though Mr. Greenspan believed the Fed would need to take "pre-emptive" action to keep the economy from overheating. Critics of the Fed have said that decision allowed the stock bubble to grow larger, setting the stage for more disruptive consequences when it finally burst in the spring of 2000.

Mr. Greenspan, in fact, had sounded a warning about the dangers of the bubble three years earlier. In a speech in December 1996, he asked: "How do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values? ... And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy?" The question caused stock prices around the world to plummet, and Mr. Greenspan got a dressing-down from some congressional leaders for asking it.

In public, Mr. Greenspan changed his approach. In August 1999, Mr. Greenspan delivered a speech in Jackson Hole, Wyo., in which he argued that monetary-policy makers shouldn't directly try to deflate stock bubbles but instead focus on ameliorating their economic effects. That is because they were incapable of identifying bubbles until after they had popped.

Within the FOMC, however, Mr. Greenspan and many of his colleagues continued to describe the activities of stock investors as characteristic of a bubble. In December 1999, he agreed with a staff forecast that predicted stock prices would stabilize. Other Fed policy makers expressed similar views



February 28, 2005
Page A2 of today's Wall Street Journal has three important articles, one of them directly relevant to Econ 421. The article is by Greg Ip and the title is Foreseeing the end of Fed's Predictability--A Return to Limited Guidance May send Long-Term Interest Rates higher.     
 It concerns the effects of the Fed' announcements, in particular, the language it uses in announcing its policy.  Recall that last week
Greenspan said that it was  a conundrum why long rates were low.  As we know, one suspect is the purchase of U.S. Treasury securities by Asian central banks (China and Japan.)  This article points out that the FOMC's Press releases, with the their "measured pace" language may be an important factor. When the Fed removes this language, the effect on long-term rates might be greater than the effect so far of pushing up the federal funds target.  The main message:  Watch what they SAY as much as they do! 

February 17, 2005
Here is the take of the Wall Street Journal (Greg Ip) on Greenspan's testimony:
 ECONOMY 
 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan speaks before Congress about interest rates, inflation and the state of the economy.

 FED WATCH

 •  The Fed's Monetary Policy Report to Congress
 
Greenspan Signals Rates Will Rise

Uncertainty Over Dollar,
Productivity Growth Cited;
Fewer Words About Pacing
By GREG IP
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
February 17, 2005; Page A2

Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan cited uncertainty over productivity growth and the dollar, indicating U.S. interest rates would keep rising in the near future to keep inflation under wraps.

Testifying before Congress, Mr. Greenspan gave fewer signals on the path of interest rates than he has in previous appearances. He didn't tell lawmakers whether interest rates would keep rising at a "measured" pace, as the Fed has said since last spring. "Measured" has come to indicate an increase of no more than a quarter of a percentage point per meeting.

Mr. Greenspan said the Fed's short-term interest rate target has risen "significantly" to 2.5% this month from 1% in June, "but by most measures, it remains fairly low" relative to inflation. That suggests that he thinks it still must rise somewhat before it is no longer stimulating overall spending and thus posing an inflation risk.

 THE FED'S FORECAST



 2004  2005 (forecast)  2006 (forecast) 
GDP growth  3.70%  3.75% to 4.0%  3.5% 
Inflation(1)  1.60%  1.5% to 1.75%  1.5% to 1.75% 
4th quarter unemployment  5.40%  5.25%  5.0% to 5.25% 

(1)Prices for personal consumption excl. food and energy

Source: Federal Reserve
 
 
 
The Fed's semi-annual monetary policy report, the subject of Mr. Greenspan's appearance before the Senate Banking Committee yesterday, shows that the central bank remains optimistic on both economic growth and inflation. Most of the 19 voting and nonvoting Federal Open Market Committee members believe the economy will grow 3.75% to 4% this year, with inflation remaining in the 1.5% to 1.75% range -- using their preferred measure. They see growth slowing only slightly to 3.5% next year and inflation in the same 1.5% to 1.75% range.

Still, Mr. Greenspan's testimony suggested he is on the lookout for evidence of inflation pressure. In particular, he noted that growth in productivity, or worker output per hour, has slowed sharply in the past year. Slowing productivity growth means companies must use more labor to increase production, which could drive up costs. Firms would then have to accept narrower profit margins or raise prices.

"Productivity is notoriously difficult to predict," he said. Its rapid growth from early 2003 through mid-2004, he said, reflected companies realizing "delayed efficiencies gains" from the 1990s high-tech investment boom. Its recent slowdown may mean "conceivably the backlog of untapped total efficiencies has run low," Mr. Greenspan said.

The Fed chairman's uncertainty over future productivity growth is noteworthy since, as Goldman Sachs economists told clients, Mr. Greenspan "has been consistently optimistic about productivity growth" and was among the first to spot its acceleration a decade ago. Still, the text of the 25-page monetary-policy report was more upbeat: "Gains in structural productivity should continue, although not necessarily at the pace of recent years."

Mr. Greenspan also suggested, as he first did two weeks ago in London, that further declines in the dollar will be more inflationary than declines to date. The "somewhat quickened" growth in import prices, he said, indicates foreign firms that export to the U.S. have "only limited tolerance" to absorb further dollar depreciation in their profit margins.

The Fed chief dwelt at length on the unusual decline in long-term bond yields since the Fed began raising short-term rates, which "contrasts with most experience." He played down technical explanations such as purchases of Treasury bonds by Asian central banks, mortgage hedging, and even confidence in low inflation.

Mr. Greenspan concluded the drop is "a conundrum," which may prove to be a "short-term aberration." He noted that measures of risk are unusually low across many markets, and, in a remark reminiscent of his warning about "irrational exuberance" in 1996, warned: "People experiencing long periods of relative stability are prone to excess. We must thus remain vigilant against complacency."

As significant as what Mr. Greenspan said is what he didn't say. Since July 2003, he has used his appearances before Congress to give guidance on the course of interest rates. In previous appearances, he has said the Fed would keep rates low for a "considerable period," then be "patient" in raising them, and now it will raise them at a "measured" pace. The paucity of such guidance yesterday may mean the central bank is less sure of what it, if anything, to say about its future actions.

On the one hand, the rise in rates to date means further increases are less urgent. But with the economy stronger and productivity growth slower, the Fed no longer has the sizable buffer against inflation that made it confident it could raise rates slowly.

Some Fed officials have frowned on the use of forward-looking language, worrying that it limits their flexibility. The majority has concluded such guidance has kept markets calm and leveraged their rate actions. Asked by Banking Chairman Richard Shelby (R., Ala.) whether the Fed's post-meeting statements would cease to refer to "measured" rate increases or an "accommodative" stance of policy, Mr. Greenspan said, "We're not going to have the same statement in perpetuity. At some point, it's going to change." But he declined to say when.

Paul Ashworth, an economist at London-based Capital Economics, predicted that the "measured" wording would stay "for a while yet. ... If the Fed was thinking of dropping it soon, Greenspan would surely have begun to prepare the ground."

Separately, the Commerce Department reported that January housing starts rose to their highest level since early 1984. They rose 4.7% to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 2.16 million units from 2.06 million in December. Building remained strong despite damaging rain in the West and snowstorms in the East. Construction of single-family homes rose 2.7% to 1.76 million units. Construction of apartments rose 14% to 399,000 units.

Also, industrial production was unchanged in January from the previous month as utilities output fell 3%, largely because of relatively warm weather, the Federal Reserve said. Industry used 79% of capacity, down from 79.1% in December. Manufacturing production rose 0.4%, and manufacturers operated at 78% of capacity, the highest utilization rate since December 2000.

Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com

 

February 17, 2005
Here is chairman Alan Greenspan's Testimony on the Semiannual Monetary Report to Congress.
Please, study it as it is.  Later, I shall keep only a few passages.
Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan.

Federal Reserve Board's semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress
Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate
February 16, 2005

Chairman Greenspan presented identical testimony before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, on February 17, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to present the Federal Reserve's Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. In the seven months since I last testified before this Committee, the U.S. economic expansion has firmed, overall inflation has subsided, and core inflation has remained low.

Over the first half of 2004, the available information increasingly suggested that the economic expansion was becoming less fragile and that the risk of an undesirable decline in inflation had greatly diminished. Toward midyear, the Federal Reserve came to the judgment that the extraordinary degree of policy accommodation that had been in place since the middle of 2003 was no longer warranted and, in the announcement released at the conclusion of our May meeting, signaled that a firming of policy was likely. The Federal Open Market Committee began to raise the federal funds rate at its June meeting, and the announcement following that meeting indicated the need for further, albeit gradual, withdrawal of monetary policy stimulus.

Around the same time, incoming data suggested a lull in activity as the economy absorbed the impact of higher energy prices. Much as had been expected, this soft patch proved to be short-lived. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve has followed the June policy move with similar actions at each meeting since then, including our most recent meeting earlier this month. The cumulative removal of policy accommodation to date has significantly raised measures of the real federal funds rate, but by most measures, it remains fairly low.

The evidence broadly supports the view that economic fundamentals have steadied. Consumer spending has been well maintained over recent months, buoyed by continued growth in disposable personal income, gains in net worth, and accommodative conditions in credit markets. Households have recorded a modest improvement in their financial position over this period, to the betterment of many indicators of credit quality. Low interest rates and rising incomes have contributed to a decline in the aggregate household financial obligation ratio, and delinquency and charge-off rates on various categories of consumer loans have stayed at low levels.

The sizable gains in consumer spending of recent years have been accompanied by a drop in the personal saving rate to an average of only 1 percent over 2004--a very low figure relative to the nearly 7 percent rate averaged over the previous three decades. Among the factors contributing to the strength of spending and the decline in saving have been developments in housing markets and home finance that have spurred rising household wealth and allowed greater access to that wealth. The rapid rise in home prices over the past several years has provided households with considerable capital gains. Moreover, a significant increase in the rate of single-family home turnover has meant that many consumers have been able to realize gains from the sale of their homes. To be sure, such capital gains, largely realized through an increase in mortgage debt on the home, do not increase the pool of national savings available to finance new capital investment. But from the perspective of an individual household, cash realized from capital gains has the same spending power as cash from any other source.

More broadly, rising home prices along with higher equity prices have outpaced the rise in household, largely mortgage, debt and have pushed up household net worth to about 5-1/2 times disposable income by the end of last year. Although the ratio of net worth to income is well below the peak attained in 1999, it remains above the long-term historical average. These gains in net worth help to explain why households in the aggregate do not appear uncomfortable with their financial position even though their reported personal saving rate is negligible.

Of course, household net worth may not continue to rise relative to income, and some reversal in that ratio is not out of the question. If that were to occur, households would probably perceive the need to save more out of current income; the personal saving rate would accordingly rise, and consumer spending would slow.

But while household spending may well play a smaller role in the expansion going forward, business executives apparently have become somewhat more optimistic in recent months. Capital spending and corporate borrowing have firmed noticeably, but some of the latter may have been directed to finance the recent backup in inventories. Mergers and acquisitions, though, have clearly perked up.

Even in the current much-improved environment, however, some caution among business executives remains. Although capital investment has been advancing at a reasonably good pace, it has nonetheless lagged the exceptional rise in profits and internal cash flow. This is most unusual; it took a deep recession to produce the last such configuration in 1975. The lingering caution evident in capital spending decisions has also been manifest in less-aggressive hiring by businesses. In contrast to the typical pattern early in previous business-cycle recoveries, firms have appeared reluctant to take on new workers and have remained focused on cost containment.

As opposed to the lingering hesitancy among business executives, participants in financial markets seem very confident about the future and, judging by the exceptionally low level of risk spreads in credit markets, quite willing to bear risk. This apparent disparity in sentiment between business people and market participants could reflect the heightened additional concerns of business executives about potential legal liabilities rather than a fundamentally different assessment of macroeconomic risks.

Turning to the outlook for costs and prices, productivity developments will likely play a key role. The growth of output per hour slowed over the past half year, giving a boost to unit labor costs after two years of declines. Going forward, the implications for inflation will be influenced by the extent and persistence of any slowdown in productivity. A lower rate of productivity growth in the context of relatively stable increases in average hourly compensation has led to slightly more rapid growth in unit labor costs. Whether inflation actually rises in the wake of slowing productivity growth, however, will depend on the rate of growth of labor compensation and the ability and willingness of firms to pass on higher costs to their customers. That, in turn, will depend on the degree of utilization of resources and how monetary policymakers respond. To date, with profit margins already high, competitive pressures have tended to limit the extent to which cost pressures have been reflected in higher prices.

Productivity is notoriously difficult to predict. Neither the large surge in output per hour from the first quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2004, nor the more recent moderation was easy to anticipate. It seems likely that these swings reflected delayed efficiency gains from the capital goods boom of the 1990s. Throughout the first half of last year, businesses were able to meet increasing orders with management efficiencies rather than new hires. But conceivably the backlog of untapped total efficiencies has run low, requiring new hires. Indeed, new hires as a percent of employment rose in the fourth quarter of last year to the highest level since the second quarter of 2001.

There is little question that the potential remains for large advances in productivity from further applications of existing knowledge, and insights into applications not even now contemplated doubtless will emerge in the years ahead. However, we have scant ability to infer the pace at which such gains will play out and, therefore, their implications for the growth of productivity over the longer run. It is, of course, the rate of change of productivity over time, and not its level, that influences the persistent changes in unit labor costs and hence the rate of inflation.

The inflation outlook will also be shaped by developments affecting the exchange value of the dollar and oil prices. Although the dollar has been declining since early 2002, exporters to the United States apparently have held dollar prices relatively steady to preserve their market share, effectively choosing to absorb the decline in the dollar by accepting a reduction in their profit margins. However, the recent somewhat quickened pace of increases in U.S. import prices suggests that profit margins of exporters to the United States have contracted to the point where the foreign shippers may exhibit only limited tolerance for additional reductions in margins should the dollar decline further.

The sharp rise in oil prices over the past year has no doubt boosted firms' costs and may have weighed on production, particularly given the sizable permanent component of oil price increases suggested by distant-horizon oil futures contracts. However, the share of total business expenses attributable to energy costs has declined appreciably over the past thirty years, which has helped to buffer profits and the economy more generally from the adverse effect of high oil and natural gas prices. Still, although the aggregate effect may be modest, we must recognize that some sectors of the economy and regions of the country have been hit hard by the increase in energy costs, especially over the past year.

Despite the combination of somewhat slower growth of productivity in recent quarters, higher energy prices, and a decline in the exchange rate for the dollar, core measures of consumer prices have registered only modest increases. The core PCE and CPI measures, for example, climbed about 1-1/4 and 2 percent, respectively, at an annual rate over the second half of last year.

All told, the economy seems to have entered 2005 expanding at a reasonably good pace, with inflation and inflation expectations well anchored. On the whole, financial markets appear to share this view. In particular, a broad array of financial indicators convey a pervasive sense of confidence among investors and an associated greater willingness to bear risk than is yet evident among business managers.

Both realized and option-implied measures of uncertainty in equity and fixed-income markets have declined markedly over recent months to quite low levels. Credit spreads, read from corporate bond yields and credit default swap premiums, have continued to narrow amid widespread signs of an improvement in corporate credit quality, including notable drops in corporate bond defaults and debt ratings downgrades. Moreover, recent surveys suggest that bank lending officers have further eased standards and terms on business loans, and anecdotal reports suggest that securities dealers and other market-makers appear quite willing to commit capital in providing market liquidity.

In this environment, long-term interest rates have trended lower in recent months even as the Federal Reserve has raised the level of the target federal funds rate by 150 basis points. This development contrasts with most experience, which suggests that, other things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates are normally accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. The simple mathematics of the yield curve governs the relationship between short- and long-term interest rates. Ten-year yields, for example, can be thought of as an average of ten consecutive one-year forward rates. A rise in the first-year forward rate, which correlates closely with the federal funds rate, would increase the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury notes even if the more-distant forward rates remain unchanged. Historically, though, even these distant forward rates have tended to rise in association with monetary policy tightening.

In the current episode, however, the more-distant forward rates declined at the same time that short-term rates were rising. Indeed, the tenth-year tranche, which yielded 6-1/2 percent last June, is now at about 5-1/4 percent. During the same period, comparable real forward rates derived from quotes on Treasury inflation-indexed debt fell significantly as well, suggesting that only a portion of the decline in nominal forward rates in distant tranches is attributable to a drop in long-term inflation expectations.

Some analysts have worried that the dip in forward real interest rates since last June may indicate that market participants have marked down their view of economic growth going forward, perhaps because of the rise in oil prices. But this interpretation does not mesh seamlessly with the rise in stock prices and the narrowing of credit spreads observed over the same interval. Others have emphasized the subdued overall business demand for credit in the United States and the apparent eagerness of lenders, including foreign investors, to provide financing. In particular, heavy purchases of longer-term Treasury securities by foreign central banks have often been cited as a factor boosting bond prices and pulling down longer-term yields. Thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage rates have dropped to a level only a little higher than the record lows touched in 2003 and, as a consequence, the estimated average duration of outstanding mortgage-backed securities has shortened appreciably over recent months. Attempts by mortgage investors to offset this decline in duration by purchasing longer-term securities may be yet another contributor to the recent downward pressure on longer-term yields.

But we should be careful in endeavoring to account for the decline in long-term interest rates by adverting to technical factors in the United States alone because yields and risk spreads have narrowed globally. The German ten-year Bund rate, for example, has declined from 4-1/4 percent last June to current levels of 3-1/2 percent. And spreads of yields on bonds issued by emerging-market nations over U.S. Treasury yields have declined to very low levels.

There is little doubt that, with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the integration of China and India into the global trading market, more of the world's productive capacity is being tapped to satisfy global demands for goods and services. Concurrently, greater integration of financial markets has meant that a larger share of the world's pool of savings is being deployed in cross-border financing of investment. The favorable inflation performance across a broad range of countries resulting from enlarged global goods, services and financial capacity has doubtless contributed to expectations of lower inflation in the years ahead and lower inflation risk premiums. But none of this is new and hence it is difficult to attribute the long-term interest rate declines of the last nine months to glacially increasing globalization. For the moment, the broadly unanticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum. Bond price movements may be a short-term aberration, but it will be some time before we are able to better judge the forces underlying recent experience.

This is but one of many uncertainties that will confront world policymakers. Over the past two decades, the industrial world has fended off two severe stock market corrections, a major financial crisis in developing nations, corporate scandals, and, of course, the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Yet overall economic activity experienced only modest difficulties. In the United States, only five quarters in the past twenty years exhibited declines in GDP, and those declines were small. Thus, it is not altogether unexpected or irrational that participants in the world marketplace would project more of the same going forward.

Yet history cautions that people experiencing long periods of relative stability are prone to excess. We must thus remain vigilant against complacency, especially since several important economic challenges confront policymakers in the years ahead.

Prominent among these challenges in the United States is the pressing need to maintain the flexibility of our economic and financial system. This will be essential if we are to address our current account deficit without significant disruption. Besides market pressures, which appear poised to stabilize and over the longer run possibly to decrease the U.S. current account deficit and its attendant financing requirements, some forces in the domestic U.S. economy seem about to head in the same direction. Central to that adjustment must be an increase in net national saving. This serves to underscore the imperative to restore fiscal discipline.

Beyond the near term, benefits promised to a burgeoning retirement-age population under mandatory entitlement programs, most notably Social Security and Medicare, threaten to strain the resources of the working-age population in the years ahead. Real progress on these issues will unavoidably entail many difficult choices. But the demographics are inexorable, and call for action before the leading edge of baby boomer retirement becomes evident in 2008. This is especially the case because longer-term problems, if not addressed, could begin to affect longer-dated debt issues, the value of which is based partly on expectations of developments many years in the future.

Another critical long-run economic challenge facing the United States is the need to ensure that our workforce is equipped with the requisite skills to compete effectively in an environment of rapid technological progress and global competition. Technological advance is continually altering the shape, nature, and complexity of our economic processes. But technology and, more recently, competition from abroad have grown to a point at which demand for the least-skilled workers in the United States and other developed countries is diminishing, placing downward pressure on their wages. These workers will need to acquire the skills required to compete effectively for the new jobs that our economy will create.

At the risk of some oversimplification, if the skill composition of our workforce meshed fully with the needs of our increasingly complex capital stock, wage-skill differentials would be stable, and percentage changes in wage rates would be the same for all job grades. But for the past twenty years, the supply of skilled, particularly highly skilled, workers has failed to keep up with a persistent rise in the demand for such skills. Conversely, the demand for lesser-skilled workers has declined, especially in response to growing international competition. The failure of our society to enhance the skills of a significant segment of our workforce has left a disproportionate share with lesser skills. The effect, of course, is to widen the wage gap between the skilled and the lesser skilled.

In a democratic society, such a stark bifurcation of wealth and income trends among large segments of the population can fuel resentment and political polarization. These social developments can lead to political clashes and misguided economic policies that work to the detriment of the economy and society as a whole. As I have noted on previous occasions, strengthening elementary and secondary schooling in the United States--especially in the core disciplines of math, science, and written and verbal communications--is one crucial element in avoiding such outcomes. We need to reduce the relative excess of lesser-skilled workers and enhance the number of skilled workers by expediting the acquisition of skills by all students, both through formal education and on-the-job training.

Although the long-run challenges confronting the U.S. economy are significant, I fully anticipate that they will ultimately be met and resolved. In recent decades our nation has demonstrated remarkable resilience and flexibility when tested by events, and we have every reason to be confident that it will weather future challenges as well. For our part, the Federal Reserve will pursue its statutory objectives of price stability and maximum sustainable employment--the latter of which we have learned can best be achieved in the long run by maintaining price stability. This is the surest contribution that the Federal Reserve can make in fostering the economic prosperity and well-being of our nation and its people.

February 2005 Monetary policy report | 2005 Testimony

February 7, 2005
Today's Wall Street Journal has an interesting article by Greg Ip about the likely reasons for the low long-term interest rates in the United States.  The article,  Low Interest Rates May Be The Norm, is well written.  It emphasizes the role of inflation expectations, as well as the high savings rate of some Asian countries.  My only complaint is that the article mentions but understates the major reason why the long rate is low:  Massive purchases of U.S. Government bonds by Asian Central Banks, notably, the People's Bank of China, and the Bank of Japan, which want to prevent a rise in the yuan and yen, respectively, to protect their exports.  (China pegs the yuan to the U.S. dollar, and Japan intervenes to protect the dollar.)  These countries are not only financing our imports but also our budget deficit.  These imbalances cannot go on forever and therein lies the major danger to the U.S. economy.
Here is the article:

Low Interest Rates
May Be the New Norm

By GREG IP
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
February 7, 2005; Page A2

Long-term interest rates in the U.S. are unusually low. They may be here to stay.

Despite widespread expectations on Wall Street that bond yields are bound to rise, some economists -- including some at the Federal Reserve -- argue that today's low yields aren't abnormal. Such yields reflect the economic reality that inflation is low and expected to remain low, and that the world is awash in savings.

If so, prices for stocks and homes are less at risk of plunging and record U.S. budget and trade deficits are less of a worry. But savers face a future of skimpy returns on stocks, bonds and other investments and President Bush's private Social Security accounts could well be a tougher sell.

On Friday, a less-robust-than-expected employment report sent the 10-year Treasury bond yield plunging to a little over 4%. That is where it stood a year ago despite subsequent economic developments that ordinarily would push yields up: The U.S. economy has strengthened, fear of deflation has evaporated, the Fed has raised short-term interest rates six times, and U.S. budget and trade deficits have widened.
 
Wall Street's overwhelming consensus is that current low rates can't last. All 45 economists polled by Blue Chip Financial Forecasts expect yields to be higher a year from now. The average forecast is 5.2%, almost identical to the -- inaccurate -- forecast the economists made a year ago. Wall Street experts cite temporary factors for the low level of rates today: increased demand for long-term bonds by underfunded pension plans and reduced supply from the mortgage market; leveraged investments by hedge funds borrowing at even lower short-term rates, and purchases by Asian central banks aimed at propping the dollar up against their currencies to protect exports.

Long-term interest rates are the sum of two components that compensate an investor for lending money long-term: expected inflation and some "real" rate of interest. The first reflects the expected loss of purchasing power from inflation. The second part reflects a variety of risks: that inflation turns out higher than expected, that the value of an investment fluctuates violently, that another asset such as stocks delivers a better return.

Inflation, excluding food and energy, has fluctuated between 2% and 2.5% since 1997 -- except when a brief dip toward 1% in 2003 aroused deflation worries. Yields on inflation-protected Treasurys suggest investors expect inflation to stay in that range for the next decade. Thus, the recent drop in long-term rates isn't because of lower inflation, but instead reflects a decline in real rates.

In the late 1990s, the real rate was between 3% and 4%. Today, it is about 1.7%.

Why do lenders demand less real return now? Some Fed officials believe it is because inflation is not only low, but expected to remain low for many years. They note that in previous periods of low and stable inflation, long-term rates were around current levels. Indeed, bond yields and underlying inflation now are right on their average since 1831 according to data supplied by the Bank Credit Analyst, a forecast journal. It is the high real rates of the 1980s and early 1990s that are anomalous.

 
Typically, long-term rates are higher than short-term rates mainly because lenders can't be sure inflation will be the same in the future as it is today. But if lenders are confident inflation will be stable, they demand less of a premium for lending money for long periods. Brian Sack, senior economist at Macroeconomic Advisers and a former Fed staffer, says, "The inflation-risk premium has fallen...considerably over the past two decades as inflation has declined and become more stable."

The Fed also has helped drive down real rates by talking more candidly about its plans for short-term interest rates. "The Fed's new policy of 'transparency' has taken the shock value out of monetary policy," writes economist Ethan Harris, of Lehman Brothers, in a report. That, he says, makes markets less volatile and investors more willing to buy longer-term, riskier assets.

Under this view, low rates for the long run are good news: They mean that house prices can remain buoyant and that today's stock valuations are more sustainable. They could also "trigger a prolonged investment cycle," says Joseph Carson, an economist at Alliance Capital Management, as U.S. companies profit from high sales growth and inexpensive capital. He notes that long-term rates fluctuated between 2.5% and 4.5% from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, when growth was strong, because inflation was low and stable.

But there is a darker interpretation: That low yields suggest prospects for profits on investments are skimpy everywhere, including on stocks. Treasurys, the world's safest investment, are the benchmark for returns on assets from stocks to real estate. Corporations that once splurged on money-losing dot-com projects now hoard cash, repurchase their shares or boost dividends. Capital spending since 2003 has persistently fallen short of cash flow, for the first time in 40 years, a pattern that holds across "almost every sector across almost every region of the world," says Vadim Zlotnikov, a strategist at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. "We have collectively lost our ability to dream."

The gargantuan U.S. current-account deficit (the shortfall on all trade and investment income with the rest of the world) is a symptom not just of inadequate saving in the U.S., but excessive saving overseas. Bond yields are below 5% in every big developed country except Australia. They are 3.5% in the euro zone and 1.3% in Japan, though their budget deficits rival that of the U.S. Latin America and OPEC have joined Asia and Europe in running current-account surpluses, notes Martin Barnes, editor of the Bank Credit Analyst. Asian central banks are buying Treasurys in part to recycle domestic savings that have no other outlet: China's personal-saving rate is 40%, compared with the U.S.'s 1%. "You just have a lot of capital out there, and a lot of that will end up in the U.S. bond market," says Mr. Barnes.

Perhaps these are all temporary factors. Mr. Zlotnikov says the resurgence of mergers and acquisitions may mean companies are rediscovering their animal spirits. As hedge funds and Asian central banks lose their taste for Treasurys, yields could rise to previous norms. Mr. Sack says 4% yields can't be justified if the Fed raises short-term rates to 4%, from 2.5% now, as he expects. The lower dollar and slower productivity growth may push inflation higher forcing the Fed to raise rates more rapidly.

But if yields stay low, Mr. Bush's personal Social Security accounts face a significant obstacle. As proposed, a worker who chooses a private account must expect a return of more than 3% on top of inflation to offset the reduction in traditional government-provided Social Security benefits at retirement. That may be a reasonable hurdle if real rates are 3%. But if they remain around 1.7%, and stock returns are commensurately lower, many workers may opt for traditional Social Security instead.



The New York Times also has an interesting article by Edmund L. Andrews, titled, Trim Deficit? Only if Bush Uses Magic, in which he examines the pending effort by the Adminisration to reduce non-defence government expenditure.



February 4, 2005

Yesterday, February 3, from 1:30 to 3:00 P.M., I had the pleasure of giving a talk at Microsoft, in the context of the Microsoft Lecture Series.  The title was:
Headwinds and Tailwinds:  Where is the U.S. Economy Going?
In addition to the attendees in the  Microsoft Conference Center, other Microsoft employees "attended"  the talk via the Web.  I enjoyed trying to answer the plethora of good, to the point, questions.  Thanks.
Here is a compact description of the issues covered:

The Issues
A quick look back: 2004 was a year of strong growth for the U.S. and the global economy
Short-term outlook:  2005 looks good but there are some short-term risks
Medium term risks:  More troublesome are the medium-term risks caused by the two deficits:  the trade deficit and the budget deficit
Long-term: The importance of productivity growth to our future

Eventually, when they become available, I hope to attach both the tape and a hard copy of the talk.


February 2, 2005

Here is the FOMC 's  Press Release.  As expected, the FOMC raised its target of the federal funds rate to 2.50 percent.  It also implicitly said that the Fed may raise the the federal funds rate in the future.  My estimate is that the Fed will keep raising the federal funds rate until it reaches at least 3.50 percent before the end of this year.


Release Date: February 2, 2005


For immediate release

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to raise its target for the federal funds rate by 25 basis points to 2-1/2 percent.

The Committee believes that, even after this action, the stance of monetary policy remains accommodative and, coupled with robust underlying growth in productivity, is providing ongoing support to economic activity. Output appears to be growing at a moderate pace despite the rise in energy prices, and labor market conditions continue to improve gradually. Inflation and longer-term inflation expectations remain well contained.

The Committee perceives the upside and downside risks to the attainment of both sustainable growth and price stability for the next few quarters to be roughly equal. With underlying inflation expected to be relatively low, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured. Nonetheless, the Committee will respond to changes in economic prospects as needed to fulfill its obligation to maintain price stability.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Alan Greenspan, Chairman; Timothy F. Geithner, Vice Chairman; Ben S. Bernanke; Susan S. Bies; Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.; Edward M. Gramlich; Jack Guynn; Donald L. Kohn; Michael H. Moskow; Mark W. Olson; Anthony M. Santomero; and Gary H. Stern.

In a related action, the Board of Governors unanimously approved a 25-basis-point increase in the discount rate to 3-1/2 percent. In taking this action, the Board approved the requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas, and San Francisco.


January 27, 2005
Today's WSJ has two interesting articles, one by Greg Ip and the other by David Wessel.  Here they are.  Hopefully, I will comment on them after my two classes today.

ECONOMY

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Fed Meeting to Pose Question
Of Setting Clear Inflation Rate

Issue of Numerical Objective
Is on Next Week's Agenda,
But Greenspan Is Resistant

By GREG IP
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
January 27, 2005

As Federal Reserve officials prepare to raise interest rates again to keep inflation from rising, they are grappling anew with an old question: Should they aim for a specific inflation number?

On the agenda for next week's two-day meeting of Fed policy makers is a discussion of whether the Fed should set a numerical objective for inflation and, if so, what it should be, according to people familiar with the matter. The Fed ponders such long-term topics twice a year, and no formal decision is likely. Nor is an explicit, public inflation target on the table.

The Fed is required by law to maintain stable prices, but it doesn't quantify that objective as a specific inflation rate. Doing so needn't be the same as setting an explicit target, which implies a duty to adjust interest rates when inflation goes above or below the specified range. Still, if Fed officials can ultimately agree on a number -- a big if -- it would be an important change from its generally successful practice of letting investors infer from its actions what constitutes acceptable inflation.

[Range-bound inflation]

Many central banks have committed to meeting an explicit target for inflation, believing a target makes them more transparent, credible and accountable. But the Fed is unlikely to join them under Chairman Alan Greenspan, who thinks a target limits his discretion to respond to differing risks as he sees fit.

The issue probably won't affect near-term monetary policy. Mr. Greenspan has defined price stability as a zone where inflation no longer materially affects companies' or individuals' decisions. At 1.5% by the Fed's preferred measure, inflation is now "roughly consistent with a working definition of price stability," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Sandra Pianalto said last week, expressing a view shared by most of her colleagues on the 19-member Federal Open Market Committee, the central bank's policy panel. The Fed wants to keep inflation in that zone, by raising its target for the federal funds rate, now 2.25%, until it no longer stimulates spending and thus poses a long-term risk of inflation.

But the issue may become more pressing if inflation drifts higher this year, and investors start to wonder how much, if at all, the Fed will raises interest rates in response.

Mickey Levy, chief economist at Bank of America, notes that in May 2003, the Fed declared that any further fall in inflation -- then running at a little over 1% -- would be "unwelcome," in effect announcing a floor for inflation. The Fed's fear was that further declines would raise the risk of deflation, or falling prices. "While they have revealed through action and statement their lower bound [for inflation] they have not had the opportunity or been forced to reveal their upper bound."

An informal survey by The Wall Street Journal found some uncertainty over the Fed's tolerance for inflation. Six of eight firms that closely watch the Fed believe it has an implicit inflation target range. Four -- Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Macroeconomic Advisers and Morgan Stanley -- say it is 1% to 2%, as measured by the price index of personal consumption excluding food and energy. (The Fed believes that index measures the cost of living more accurately than the better-known consumer-price index.) A fifth, ISI group, says it is 1.5% to 2.5%. Merrill Lynch says 1.5% to 2%, and J.P. Morgan Chase and Lehman Brothers say there isn't any implicit target.

FOMC members who have advocated a numerical objective or target have offered varying ranges. Governor Ben Bernanke has said 1% to 2%. Governor Edward Gramlich has suggested 1% to 2.5%. Philadelphia Fed President Anthony Santomero last October proposed 1% to 3%, and St. Louis Fed President William Poole advocates a target of zero, with some allowance for errors in measurement.

Advocates believe a target would enable investors to better predict how the Fed will respond to changing economic circumstances and solidify its commitment to price stability under Mr. Greenspan's successor next year.

But opponents, who include governors Roger Ferguson and Donald Kohn, fret that targets would confer an obligation to change interest rates whenever inflation deviated from the target, even if unemployment or financial stability called for different actions.

An inflation "objective" might be a compromise between an explicit target and no number. Mr. Gramlich said in a speech in 2003 that the Fed could simply state its preferred long-run range for inflation: "The FOMC would not have to defend any deviations from the preferred range."

History suggests Mr. Greenspan would resist even that step. When the FOMC last formally addressed the issue in July 1996, it reached a near consensus that 2% was the right goal. Mr. Greenspan then, according to a transcript, warned his colleagues, "If the 2% inflation figure gets out of this room, it is going to create more problems for us than I think any of you might anticipate."

Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com


And the Wessel article:

CAPITAL
By DAVID WESSEL


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See a brief bio on U.S. Federal Reserve governor Edward Gramlich. Also, read some of Mr. Gramlich's relevant speeches on Social Security reform and the rules for assessing those reforms.

 

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Reader comments -- and David Wessel's answers -- about the Capital column. Published Tuesday mornings.

 
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Social Security -- Getting Some Perspective
January 27, 2005; Page A2

In a U.S. Social Security debate in which partisans cite facts selectively to justify their positions, newspaper columnists occasionally turn for perspective to veterans on the sidelines.

One is Edward "Ned" Gramlich, a U.S. Federal Reserve governor who chaired a Social Security advisory commission a decade ago. The former dean of the University of Michigan's School of Public Policy and a liberal Democrat, Mr. Gramlich argues that it's time to fix Social Security. He advocates private accounts -- as long as they're on top of Social Security, not created by diverting payroll taxes as President Bush proposes. Here's how he sees today's debate:

Q: Does Social Security need major repair?

A: I don't think the system is in crisis. But we can make much more desirable changes if they're made early. The problem with waiting until the car is about to go off the road is that our options are constricted. It's hard to make sensible benefit cuts if people have already retired or are close to retirement. It's easier to do if cuts are well-advertised. In the past, we have waited, the benefit system has expanded and we've raised the payroll tax. At some point, we can't do that.

Q: Are we at that point?

A: We could raise the payroll tax a bit without huge economic consequences. But at some point we do want to get off the treadmill where we set a benefit system that we can't quite afford and then raise taxes to pay for it. I am, by the way, all for making the payroll tax slightly less regressive by raising the maximum wage subject to the tax.

Q: Why insist on preserving the existing Social Security framework?

A: If we were to go to a system that was entirely individual accounts, we probably couldn't have large backstop benefits to protect people. Many advocates of individual accounts would have something like a floor benefit level to protect people and private accounts on top of that, but that floor can be pretty low. The system we have now does work well and is really not all that costly. The cost is going to grow a bit as the population ages, but not much. It's tried and true. I don't see why we can't retain it.

Q: Then why did you back individual accounts as an add-on to Social Security?

A: I'd like to protect the basic benefits, but we need more saving. We need it because people don't save enough for retirement. We need it to finance the benefit system we have. And need it for the nation's macroeconomics. One way to get new saving is to raise payroll taxes. I didn't think that was either politically feasible or necessary. Another way is to mandate that people save a bit on top of Social Security. This differs from a tax increase because they would ultimately get the money back, but the main motivation is to increase national saving. Increasing national saving implies reducing consumption. It's not a surprise that this is a hard sell.

[Edward Gramlich]

Q: Why do you oppose diverting payroll taxes to private accounts?

A: With carve-out individual accounts, we erode social protections at a time when we also seem to be witnessing the collapse of the corporate defined-benefit pension system. If we go to a retirement system that is entirely individual accounts, we also lose opportunities for income redistribution.

Q: The age at which workers get full benefits is rising to 67. Why would you lift it?

A: People in my grandfather's generation who got to age 65 paid into Social Security for 40 years and got benefits for about 10. People in my grandson's would collect benefits for more than 20 years. As life expectancy increases, the disparity gets increasingly unfair across generations. An easy way to restore fairness and to make a huge impact on the actuarial deficit of Social Security is to have the retirement age go up in line with overall life expectancy -- in an automatic way so Congress wouldn't have wrenching decisions every few years.

Q: Some say that'd be unfair to those with physically demanding jobs.

A: That's a bad rap. The retirement age would rise very slowly, about a year every decade. The main impact would be felt by workers in their 20s and 30s today. The share of workers who work in physically demanding occupations is falling every year and is going to be very low by the time they retire. I would still permit people to retire early and get reduced benefits. They're probably going to get a benefit cut, whatever happens.

Q: How well does our political system deal with Social Security?

A: We do have to make cuts in benefits or increases in taxes. We can do much more sensible things if we act early. But it's hard to generate the requisite urgency when the system is projected to be paying full benefits for the next 40 years or so. I'm not an advocate of the president's general approach, but I have sympathy for arguments that the president's people are making about the wisdom of acting now.

Write to David Wessel at capital@wsj.com




January 24, 2005
Here is an interesting article by Edmund Andrews in yesterday's New York Times:
It concerns the U.S. budget deficit and its effect on the economy.  More important, it relates to possible reaction by the Fed, which  means one thing:  Interest rate will rise, not simply because the economy is getting stronger--the five "measured" increases of the federal funds rate, from 1.00 pecent to 2.25, percent by the Fed concerned just that--but because of investor worries.  This means that as domestic and foreign investors move away from U.S. Treasury securities, their interest rate will rise.  It may also mean that the Fed may become more aggressive in raising the federal funds rate.

This article is important for both the Econ 301H  Seminar and Econ 421.  Please, read it all.  Here, I emphasize the following five paragraphs:
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

But something new is afoot, and it is not just that the Fed is raising rates back to more normal levels. So far, a measured pace of rate increases has merely reflected the Fed's increased confidence that economic growth is on a steady course.

The new element is a rising concern at the Fed about the nation's imbalances: the federal deficit, which hit $413 billion in 2004; a low and declining national savings rate; evidence of speculative behavior among investors and consumers; and the country's enormous trade and financial deficit with the rest of the world.

In November, Mr. Greenspan noted that foreign claims on United States assets - essentially the nation's net indebtedness to the rest of the world - were now equal to one-quarter of the nation's gross domestic product. The trade deficit this year is almost certain to exceed $600 billion - nearly 6 percent of the nation's economy, and still climbing.

"This situation suggests that international investors will eventually adjust their accumulation of dollar assets or, alternatively, seek higher dollar returns to offset concentration risk," Mr. Greenspan said. That, he continued, would make the cost of foreign debt "increasingly less tenable."

To most economists, such comments are simply a statement of time-honored truth: a borrower who runs up huge debts will become a bigger risk to lenders and gradually have to pay higher rates. But Mr. Greenspan's comments also carried a warning: rising budget and trade deficits come at the price of higher interest rates.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX


ECONOMIC VIEW

Deficits May Be Wearing Thin at the Fed

By EDMUND L. ANDREWS

Published: January 23, 2005

WASHINGTON

THEY are only low-level rumblings, oblique signals of discontent that are stripped of any direct political threat.

But as President Bush embarked on his second term last week, it was hard to escape the sense that his longtime honeymoon with the Federal Reserve may be ending.

Advertisement

The Fed and its chairman, Alan Greenspan, have arguably been Mr. Bush's most important economic supporters. Mr. Greenspan gave his blessing to the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and, less enthusiastically, to those of 2003.

Despite Mr. Greenspan's reputation as a staunch opponent of fiscal deficits, he tiptoed around criticism of the soaring federal debt that Mr. Bush ran up in his first term and will almost certainly continue to run up in his second.

Perhaps most important, the Greenspan Fed cut interest rates and showered the nation with cheap money to soften the recession of 2001 and to keep consumers spending through nearly three years of rising unemployment.

But something new is afoot, and it is not just that the Fed is raising rates back to more normal levels. So far, a measured pace of rate increases has merely reflected the Fed's increased confidence that economic growth is on a steady course.

The new element is a rising concern at the Fed about the nation's imbalances: the federal deficit, which hit $413 billion in 2004; a low and declining national savings rate; evidence of speculative behavior among investors and consumers; and the country's enormous trade and financial deficit with the rest of the world.

In November, Mr. Greenspan noted that foreign claims on United States assets - essentially the nation's net indebtedness to the rest of the world - were now equal to one-quarter of the nation's gross domestic product. The trade deficit this year is almost certain to exceed $600 billion - nearly 6 percent of the nation's economy, and still climbing.

"This situation suggests that international investors will eventually adjust their accumulation of dollar assets or, alternatively, seek higher dollar returns to offset concentration risk," Mr. Greenspan said. That, he continued, would make the cost of foreign debt "increasingly less tenable."

To most economists, such comments are simply a statement of time-honored truth: a borrower who runs up huge debts will become a bigger risk to lenders and gradually have to pay higher rates. But Mr. Greenspan's comments also carried a warning: rising budget and trade deficits come at the price of higher interest rates.

The Fed fired off another warning in the published minutes from its policy meeting on Dec. 14, saying, "a number of participants voiced concerns about domestic and global financial imbalances." Some members of the Federal Open Market Committee, which sets policy, were said to believe that the odds of "significant deficit reduction over the next few years were remote."

More surprising, the minutes said that some policy makers worried that the prolonged strategy of low rates might be fostering "excessive risk-taking" in financial markets and in the market for houses and condominiums. That sounded like a veiled reference to concern about a "housing bubble," an idea that Mr. Greenspan has repeatedly shot down.

A third veiled warning came on Jan. 13 from Timothy F. Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In a speech to financial executives about risk management, Mr. Geithner suggested that investors had become too complacent about risks posed by global imbalances - particularly those in the United States.

Declaring that the current account deficit had reached an "unprecedented scale," even as investors continue to demand very low risk premiums, Mr. Geithner warned that they had little buffer for unexpected shocks.

"The present fiscal trajectory entails an uncomfortable scale of borrowing and little insurance against possible adverse outcomes in an uncertain world," he said.

In private sessions, Mr. Greenspan may well be warning Mr. Bush in blunter terms. The Fed chairman meets regularly with Vice President Dick Cheney and periodically with Mr. Bush.










January 20, 2005
An important article in the Wall Street Journal by Greg Ip, concerning the recent slowdown in productivity growth and possible Fed reaction.  The article also refers to a speech by Fed Governor Ben Bernanke yesterday.  The aricle is found in the Fed website under speeches.

http://online.wsj.com/article_email/0,,SB110616027018830291-IBjg4NilaB4nZ2uZIGIaaWAm4,00.html

BEIGE BOOK REPORT
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Fed Officials Weigh the Effects
Of Slower Productivity Growth

Impact on Inflation Rate
And Interest-Rate Policy
To Be Put Under Scrutiny

By GREG IP
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
January 20, 2005

Almost a decade after Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan identified higher productivity as the key to inflation-free economic expansion, Fed officials see productivity growth slowing down -- and are studying how that may affect inflation and how fast they should raise interest rates.

At the moment, officials believe the productivity slowdown isn't dramatic enough to push inflation above its recent, moderate trend. The Labor Department said yesterday that inflation, excluding food and energy, was 2.2% in the 12 months that ended in December. That pace was unchanged from November but up sharply from a low of 1.1% in January 2004. (Full report)

"Inflationary pressures remained largely in check in December and early January," concluded a roundup of business conditions in the Fed's 12 districts, released yesterday.

That suggests the Fed, for now, is likely to continue raising its short-term interest-rate target, currently 2.25%, by a quarter percentage point at each meeting. It meets next Feb. 1 and Feb. 2.

[Downswing]

But Fed officials are scrutinizing a recent deceleration in productivity growth, largely because its acceleration in prior years has been such a powerful damper on inflation. Fed governor Ben Bernanke said yesterday that he thinks productivity is likely to grow between 2% and 2.5% in the long run but that if it unexpectedly falls below that in the next few years, and the economy doesn't weaken at the same time, that "would likely [result in] higher inflation," and call for steeper increases in rates. If productivity growth accelerates instead, the Fed could adopt a looser monetary policy, he told the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Productivity refers to how much output a worker produces in an hour and helps to determine Americans' standard of living. Productivity growth also determines the economy's "speed limit," that is, how fast it can grow without putting upward pressure on inflation.

The faster productivity grows, the less costly it is for a company to produce a unit of output and the less pressure it has to raise prices. Conversely, a slowdown in productivity growth makes additional production costlier, prompting firms to raise prices to maintain profit margins.

Productivity growth averaged 1.5% a year from 1973 to 1995. Then, in a development Mr. Greenspan early on attributed to companies' ability to tap into high technology, it steadily accelerated, averaging 2.6% a year from 1995 to 2000. That enabled the economy to grow and the unemployment rate to drop sharply without the Fed's having to raise interest rates drastically out of fear of inflation.

From 2001 to 2003, productivity growth accelerated even further, to 4.2%. That meant that even though wages and benefits were rising between 3% and 4% a year, labor costs, adjusted for rising output per worker, were actually declining. That spectacular productivity performance led to the "jobless recovery," because firms were able to meet rising sales without more workers.

More important to the Fed, productivity growth has served as a powerful buffer against inflation; indeed, by driving labor costs down, it contributed to the Fed's deflation worries in 2003. As long as productivity remained strong, the Fed worried less about higher commodity prices and numerous other factors that normally would unsettle it.

But in the past six months, that buffer has started to shrink. Productivity growth slowed sharply to an annual rate of about 2% in the second half of last year, near the bottom of the 2% to 3% annual rate that many at the Fed believe it should achieve over the long haul. Unit labor costs are now rising. This leaves the Fed much less margin for error on inflation.

What is behind the slowdown? Mr. Greenspan said last year that the corporate technology-spending spree of the 1990s created a "backlog of unexploited capabilities for enhancing productivity," and that companies turned to this backlog when the economy turned down in 2001, in search of ways to cuts costs and avoid adding workers. The productivity slowdown in recent months might mean that companies have used up much of that backlog and will have to invest more to boost future productivity.

There appears little sign the Fed, or Mr. Greenspan, have lost their long-term optimism on the productivity potential of new technology. A continuation of strong productivity growth would be good for higher profits and wages, and even alleviate Social Security's long-term funding shortfall. A survey of purchasing managers conducted at Mr. Greenspan's request has found, year after year, that most feel they have exploited only half the potential of new technology. "Estimates of structural productivity growth remain high, although there has been some moderation recently," Tim Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, said yesterday in a speech to the Business Council of Fairfield County, Conn.

Others are less sure. In a speech last year, Fed Vice Chairman Roger Ferguson cited signs that the pace of innovation is slowing: The price of computing power is not falling as rapidly as it once did and fewer new personal-computer models are being introduced. Even if the long-run trend for productivity growth remains bright, Fed officials are watching to see whether temporary factors pull it below that long-term trend for the next year or so, creating inflation risks.

Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com







January 19, 2005
In preparation for its February 1st and 2nd FOMC meeting, the Fed published today its Beige Book.  This report, gives the Fed's assessment of the state of the US economy as a whole--see the Summary--and for each of the 12 Districts.  Please, access this report at

 http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/beigebook/2005/20050119/default.htm
 
I suggest, your read, at the very least, the Summary (for the entire nation) and the Report on the 12th District, the San Francisco Fed.

Below, is the first paragraph of the Summary:

Reports from the twelve Federal Reserve districts indicated that economic activity continued to expand from late November through early January. Eleven districts characterized activity as expanding with Atlanta, New York, and Richmond noting that the pace of activity had quickened since their last reports. The Cleveland District was less upbeat, characterizing economic activity in that district as mixed.

And the first paragraph of the report on the 12th District, the San Francisco Fed:

The Twelfth District economy continued to expand at a solid pace in late November and December. Contacts reported little or no pickup in the pace of overall price increases. The pace of cost increases for selected inputs eased, albeit from high levels. Several contacts noted that some of the higher input costs were passed on to consumers, though efficiency gains helped hold down overall production costs. Wages and salary pressures remained modest but up slightly overall. Strong export growth contributed to improving demand conditions in most sectors. Holiday retail sales, on balance, were up compared with last year, with retailers stepping up discounting in late December. Manufacturers, agricultural producers, and transportation and other service providers generally reported strong demand. Activity in District residential real estate markets remained robust, though it moderated in some areas. District banks reported overall solid loan demand and good credit quality.




January 27, 2005
Today's WSJ has two interesting articles, one by Greg Ip and the other by David Wessel.  Here they are.  Hopefully, I will comment on them after by two classes today.

ECONOMY
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Fed Meeting to Pose Question
Of Setting Clear Inflation Rate

Issue of Numerical Objective
Is on Next Week's Agenda,
But Greenspan Is Resistant

By GREG IP
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
January 27, 2005

As Federal Reserve officials prepare to raise interest rates again to keep inflation from rising, they are grappling anew with an old question: Should they aim for a specific inflation number?

On the agenda for next week's two-day meeting of Fed policy makers is a discussion of whether the Fed should set a numerical objective for inflation and, if so, what it should be, according to people familiar with the matter. The Fed ponders such long-term topics twice a year, and no formal decision is likely. Nor is an explicit, public inflation target on the table.

The Fed is required by law to maintain stable prices, but it doesn't quantify that objective as a specific inflation rate. Doing so needn't be the same as setting an explicit target, which implies a duty to adjust interest rates when inflation goes above or below the specified range. Still, if Fed officials can ultimately agree on a number -- a big if -- it would be an important change from its generally successful practice of letting investors infer from its actions what constitutes acceptable inflation.

[Range-bound inflation]

Many central banks have committed to meeting an explicit target for inflation, believing a target makes them more transparent, credible and accountable. But the Fed is unlikely to join them under Chairman Alan Greenspan, who thinks a target limits his discretion to respond to differing risks as he sees fit.

The issue probably won't affect near-term monetary policy. Mr. Greenspan has defined price stability as a zone where inflation no longer materially affects companies' or individuals' decisions. At 1.5% by the Fed's preferred measure, inflation is now "roughly consistent with a working definition of price stability," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Sandra Pianalto said last week, expressing a view shared by most of her colleagues on the 19-member Federal Open Market Committee, the central bank's policy panel. The Fed wants to keep inflation in that zone, by raising its target for the federal funds rate, now 2.25%, until it no longer stimulates spending and thus poses a long-term risk of inflation.

But the issue may become more pressing if inflation drifts higher this year, and investors start to wonder how much, if at all, the Fed will raises interest rates in response.

Mickey Levy, chief economist at Bank of America, notes that in May 2003, the Fed declared that any further fall in inflation -- then running at a little over 1% -- would be "unwelcome," in effect announcing a floor for inflation. The Fed's fear was that further declines would raise the risk of deflation, or falling prices. "While they have revealed through action and statement their lower bound [for inflation] they have not had the opportunity or been forced to reveal their upper bound."

An informal survey by The Wall Street Journal found some uncertainty over the Fed's tolerance for inflation. Six of eight firms that closely watch the Fed believe it has an implicit inflation target range. Four -- Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Macroeconomic Advisers and Morgan Stanley -- say it is 1% to 2%, as measured by the price index of personal consumption excluding food and energy. (The Fed believes that index measures the cost of living more accurately than the better-known consumer-price index.) A fifth, ISI group, says it is 1.5% to 2.5%. Merrill Lynch says 1.5% to 2%, and J.P. Morgan Chase and Lehman Brothers say there isn't any implicit target.

FOMC members who have advocated a numerical objective or target have offered varying ranges. Governor Ben Bernanke has said 1% to 2%. Governor Edward Gramlich has suggested 1% to 2.5%. Philadelphia Fed President Anthony Santomero last October proposed 1% to 3%, and St. Louis Fed President William Poole advocates a target of zero, with some allowance for errors in measurement.

Advocates believe a target would enable investors to better predict how the Fed will respond to changing economic circumstances and solidify its commitment to price stability under Mr. Greenspan's successor next year.

But opponents, who include governors Roger Ferguson and Donald Kohn, fret that targets would confer an obligation to change interest rates whenever inflation deviated from the target, even if unemployment or financial stability called for different actions.

An inflation "objective" might be a compromise between an explicit target and no number. Mr. Gramlich said in a speech in 2003 that the Fed could simply state its preferred long-run range for inflation: "The FOMC would not have to defend any deviations from the preferred range."

History suggests Mr. Greenspan would resist even that step. When the FOMC last formally addressed the issue in July 1996, it reached a near consensus that 2% was the right goal. Mr. Greenspan then, according to a transcript, warned his colleagues, "If the 2% inflation figure gets out of this room, it is going to create more problems for us than I think any of you might anticipate."

Write to Greg Ip at greg.ip@wsj.com


And the Wessel article:

CAPITAL
By DAVID WESSEL


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Social Security -- Getting Some Perspective
January 27, 2005; Page A2

In a U.S. Social Security debate in which partisans cite facts selectively to justify their positions, newspaper columnists occasionally turn for perspective to veterans on the sidelines.

One is Edward "Ned" Gramlich, a U.S. Federal Reserve governor who chaired a Social Security advisory commission a decade ago. The former dean of the University of Michigan's School of Public Policy and a liberal Democrat, Mr. Gramlich argues that it's time to fix Social Security. He advocates private accounts -- as long as they're on top of Social Security, not created by diverting payroll taxes as President Bush proposes. Here's how he sees today's debate:

Q: Does Social Security need major repair?

A: I don't think the system is in crisis. But we can make much more desirable changes if they're made early. The problem with waiting until the car is about to go off the road is that our options are constricted. It's hard to make sensible benefit cuts if people have already retired or are close to retirement. It's easier to do if cuts are well-advertised. In the past, we have waited, the benefit system has expanded and we've raised the payroll tax. At some point, we can't do that.

Q: Are we at that point?

A: We could raise the payroll tax a bit without huge economic consequences. But at some point we do want to get off the treadmill where we set a benefit system that we can't quite afford and then raise taxes to pay for it. I am, by the way, all for making the payroll tax slightly less regressive by raising the maximum wage subject to the tax.

Q: Why insist on preserving the existing Social Security framework?

A: If we were to go to a system that was entirely individual accounts, we probably couldn't have large backstop benefits to protect people. Many advocates of individual accounts would have something like a floor benefit level to protect people and private accounts on top of that, but that floor can be pretty low. The system we have now does work well and is really not all that costly. The cost is going to grow a bit as the population ages, but not much. It's tried and true. I don't see why we can't retain it.

Q: Then why did you back individual accounts as an add-on to Social Security?

A: I'd like to protect the basic benefits, but we need more saving. We need it because people don't save enough for retirement. We need it to finance the benefit system we have. And need it for the nation's macroeconomics. One way to get new saving is to raise payroll taxes. I didn't think that was either politically feasible or necessary. Another way is to mandate that people save a bit on top of Social Security. This differs from a tax increase because they would ultimately get the money back, but the main motivation is to increase national saving. Increasing national saving implies reducing consumption. It's not a surprise that this is a hard sell.

[Edward Gramlich]

Q: Why do you oppose diverting payroll taxes to private accounts?

A: With carve-out individual accounts, we erode social protections at a time when we also seem to be witnessing the collapse of the corporate defined-benefit pension system. If we go to a retirement system that is entirely individual accounts, we also lose opportunities for income redistribution.

Q: The age at which workers get full benefits is rising to 67. Why would you lift it?

A: People in my grandfather's generation who got to age 65 paid into Social Security for 40 years and got benefits for about 10. People in my grandson's would collect benefits for more than 20 years. As life expectancy increases, the disparity gets increasingly unfair across generations. An easy way to restore fairness and to make a huge impact on the actuarial deficit of Social Security is to have the retirement age go up in line with overall life expectancy -- in an automatic way so Congress wouldn't have wrenching decisions every few years.

Q: Some say that'd be unfair to those with physically demanding jobs.

A: That's a bad rap. The retirement age would rise very slowly, about a year every decade. The main impact would be felt by workers in their 20s and 30s today. The share of workers who work in physically demanding occupations is falling every year and is going to be very low by the time they retire. I would still permit people to retire early and get reduced benefits. They're probably going to get a benefit cut, whatever happens.

Q: How well does our political system deal with Social Security?

A: We do have to make cuts in benefits or increases in taxes. We can do much more sensible things if we act early. But it's hard to generate the requisite urgency when the system is projected to be paying full benefits for the next 40 years or so. I'm not an advocate of the president's general approach, but I have sympathy for arguments that the president's people are making about the wisdom of acting now.

Write to David Wessel at capital@wsj.com